This is a summary of several recent court rulings addressing key issues in the field of labour law. These decisions, issued by the Supreme Court and the High Court of Justice of Galicia, deal with matters relating to the accrual of days of discretionary leave during periods of temporary incapacity, the starting point for taking leave due to the hospitalisation of a family member, and the commencement of the 20‑working‑day period to challenge a substantial modification of working conditions where such modification has not been notified in writing.

Supreme Court judgment of 14 January 2026 (appeal no. 189/2024)

In this collective dispute, the Supreme Court addresses two issues concerning the interpretation and application of Article 53.1(b) of the State-wide Collective Agreement for Care Services for Dependent Persons and the Promotion of Personal Autonomy, which regulates discretionary leave. Specifically: (i) whether this leave may be taken at any time during the year, including in advance of accrual, or whether it requires the prior completion of three months of effective service before it can be taken; and (ii) whether periods of temporary incapacity should be counted as working time for the purposes of accruing entitlement to such days.

As regards the first issue, the relevant provision states that “in any event, employees shall be entitled to enjoy these four days, without justification, before 15 January of the following year. The taking of these four days shall require a prior period of work of three months for each discretionary day.” The Supreme Court interprets this provision as meaning that each discretionary day accrued may be taken after the completion of each quarter, and that such days may be accumulated. Accordingly, the first discretionary day accrued may be taken in the second quarter of the year; the second day in the third quarter; the third day in the fourth quarter; and the fourth day during the first 15 days of the following year. The Court also confirms that discretionary leave days may be taken cumulatively. For example, if by the fourth quarter none of the three previously accrued days has been taken, they may all be taken during that quarter.

As regards the second issue, namely whether periods of temporary incapacity count for the accrual of discretionary leave, the Supreme Court finds that the collective agreement recognises a form of unconditional rest leave that does not require justification. Accordingly, it considers that the accrual of such discretionary days is comparable to annual leave under Article 2.2 of Directive 2003/88/EC. Furthermore, it holds that Article 5 of ILO Convention No. 158 does not allow periods of absence due to reasons beyond the employee’s control, such as temporary incapacity leave, to be excluded from the accrual of annual leave. Referring also to the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (including, inter alia, the Schultz‑Hoff and Others judgment, cases C‑350/06 and C‑520/06), the Court reiterates that employees on sick leave must be treated in the same way as those who have effectively performed work during the same period. In conclusion, it holds that discretionary leave days continue to accrue during periods of temporary incapacity.

Supreme Court judgment of 4 February 2026 (appeal no. 251/2024)

The Supreme Court rules on a cassation appeal against the judgment of the National High Court of 12 September 2024, delivered in collective proceedings brought by several trade unions. The substantive issue concerns whether an employer may require that the paid leave provided for in Article 37.3(b) of the Workers’ Statute, in cases of serious accident or illness, hospitalisation, or surgical intervention without hospitalisation but requiring home rest, must necessarily commence on the first working day following the triggering event.

The dispute arose from an internal note issued by the company on 29 November 2023 to adapt its leave arrangements to the reform introduced by Royal Decree‑law 5/2023, which stated that leave under Article 37.3(b) of the Workers’ Statute “shall commence on the first working day for the employee following the event giving rise to the leave”.

The Court reasons that these types of leave are functionally linked to a genuine need to provide care and assistance to the ill or convalescent family member, a need that does not necessarily end in the days immediately following the event and may require more flexible planning of care. Rigidly tying the start of the leave to the triggering event undermines its protective purpose and prevents effective assistance. Neither the law, nor the applicable collective agreement, nor Directive (EU) 2019/1158 contains an express rule imposing such automatic linkage.

To reinforce this reasoning, the Court refers back to its previous case law distinguishing between hospital discharge and medical discharge, applying it a contrario: just as leave cannot be maintained once the need for care has ceased, its commencement cannot be artificially restricted while such needs persist. The judgment thus establishes a balanced rule: the leave cannot become a pool of days off detached from the protected situation, but nor can it be deprived of its substance through an excessively rigid interpretation of the triggering event.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court holds that leave under Article 37.3(b) of the Workers’ Statute cannot be managed in such a way that its commencement is necessarily tied to the triggering event where neither the law nor the collective agreement expressly so provides, and that there must be scope for a rational distribution allowing for planned and effective care of the person in need. The cassation appeal is therefore dismissed, and the judgment of the National High Court is upheld.

Supreme Court judgment of 9 February 2026 (appeal no. 734/2025)

The Supreme Court examines whether a transfer of undertaking occurred in the context of the termination of a lease agreement relating to a tourist apartment complex. The main issue is whether the reversion of the operation to the owning company upon expiry of the lease with the former operator constitutes a transfer of an economic entity under Article 44 of the Workers’ Statute, thereby requiring the subrogation of the permanent seasonal workforce.

The background to the dispute dates back to December 2022, when the lease expired after ten years. The outgoing company informed employees that a transfer of undertaking would take place and that they would become part of the new operator’s workforce. However, the incoming owner refused to subrogate the staff, arguing that it would not continue the tourist activity but would instead proceed to sell the apartments individually. Following the lack of a call‑back for the next season (March 2023), the claimant employee brought unfair dismissal proceedings, which were upheld at first instance, the dismissal being classified as null and void as it constituted a disguised collective dismissal.

The Court bases its decision on an analysis of whether there was a transfer of an economic entity retaining its identity. It reasons that in the hospitality sector the infrastructure (the property and its equipment) constitutes the essential element of the activity. Since ownership reverted not only of the buildings but also of all furniture, fittings, licences and utilities necessary for immediate operation, there was in fact a transfer of decisive tangible assets. The subsequent decision by the new owner to change the purpose of the business (to property sales) does not preclude the application of Article 44 of the Workers’ Statute, as the complex was capable of continuing to operate as an economic entity at the time of reversion.

As regards liability, the Supreme Court clarifies the consequences of partially upholding the appeal. While it confirms the existence of a transfer of undertaking, it holds that the outgoing company is absolved from liability for the consequences of the dismissal (reinstatement or compensation), which fall instead on the new owner due to its refusal to subrogate. However, the outgoing company remains liable for employment‑related debts accrued prior to the transfer.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court partially upholds the appeal for the unification of case law, confirming the existence of a transfer of undertaking and declaring that the obligation to subrogate and the consequences of dismissal due to failure to call back employees lie with the new owner of the economic entity.

Supreme Court judgment of 18 February 2026 (appeal no. 243/2024)

In this case, the Supreme Court examines whether the action brought by UGT against the removal of employees’ entitlement to one paid day of leave for personal matters in a company in the province of Alicante was time‑barred and, subsidiarily, whether that entitlement constituted a more favourable employment condition.

The claimant union brought the action under the procedure for substantial modification of working conditions (SMWC) pursuant to Article 138 of the Law Regulating the Labour Jurisdiction, which requires claims to be filed within 20 working days following written notification of the employer’s decision. In this case, the workforce had been entitled to one day of paid personal leave under the provincial hospitality collective agreement. However, from 2013 onwards, the applicable agreement changed to the company’s own collective agreement, which did not provide for such leave. Despite this, the company continued to grant the paid leave to employees who had previously enjoyed it under the provincial agreement until December 2022, when the state‑wide sectoral collective agreement for modern restaurant brands was published in the Official State Gazette, also making no provision for such leave. It was not until January 2024 that a request for mediation and arbitration was filed against the company’s decision not to recognise the leave, at which point the company formally stated that it no longer granted it because it was not provided for in the state‑wide agreement.

The Supreme Court holds that Article 138 of the Law Regulating the Labour Jurisdiction requires written communication of the employer’s decision in order for the 20‑working‑day limitation period to begin. In the absence of such written notification, the time limit does not commence, and the claim must therefore be deemed to have been filed in time. Furthermore, the Court finds that a more favourable employment condition existed, given that the paid personal leave had been maintained uninterruptedly for nine years (from the application of the provincial agreement in 2013 until the application of the state‑wide agreement in 2022). Consequently, if the company wished to remove that more favourable condition, it should have followed the SMWC procedure set out in Article 41 of the Workers’ Statute.

Judgment of the High Court of Justice of Galicia of 10 December 2025 (appeal no. 2683/2025)

In this judgment, the High Court of Justice of Galicia rules on the appeal brought by an employee against judgment no. 108/2025 of Social Court No. 4 of Vigo, which had partially upheld the claim by declaring the objective dismissal unfair while rejecting the claim of nullity for lack of evidence of infringement of fundamental rights.

By way of background, the employee, who held a managerial position, was on sick leave from August to December 2023. Meanwhile, on 12 December 2023, while the employee was still on sick leave, the company agreed with the trade union representatives that employees who had been on temporary incapacity for more than three months in the calendar year would not be entitled to the MIP bonus (individual variable remuneration linked to objectives). When the employee did not receive the bonus in February 2024, she challenged this internally, arguing that the agreement could not be applied retroactively as her sick leave had begun prior to its entry into force. The High Court of Justice of Galicia agrees with this position, noting that as of the date of medical discharge (1 December 2023) the required three‑month period had not yet elapsed. Two weeks after reiterating her claim regarding the bonus, the employee received a letter notifying her of dismissal on objective grounds.

In light of these circumstances, the High Court declares the dismissal null and void on two grounds. First, due to a breach of the guarantee of indemnity, given the close chronological link between the bonus claim and the dismissal. Second, due to discrimination on grounds of sex, as the company filled the position previously held by the employee without any selection process, directly appointing a man, particularly given that 89.29% of managerial positions were held by men.

Consequently, the company was ordered to reinstate the employee immediately, pay back wages, compensate her with EUR 20,000 for moral damages, and include the MIP bonus in the calculation of the reference salary for dismissal purposes.

Royal Decree‑law 3/2026 of 3 February, on the revaluation of public pensions and other urgent Social Security measures

Royal Decree‑law 3/2026 of 3 February addresses the revaluation of public pensions and other urgent Social Security measures. Its adoption was prompted by the absence of a General State Budget Act for 2026—resulting in the automatic extension of the 2023 Budget—and by the failure of Parliament to ratify Royal Decree‑law 16/2025 of 23 December, which had updated pensions in January 2026. The enactment of this new decree‑law was therefore deemed urgent and necessary in order to safeguard the rights of pensioners whose pensions had been increased in January 2026.

Royal Decree‑law 7/2026 of 20 March approving the Comprehensive Response Plan to the Crisis in the Middle East

Article 62 of Royal Decree‑law 7/2026 establishes a “dismissal prohibition” for companies benefiting from the direct aid provided for under this decree‑law. Specifically, such companies may not carry out dismissals on grounds of force majeure or on economic, technical, organisational or production grounds derived from the situation the decree‑law seeks to address, until 30 June 2026. Breach of this obligation will result in the repayment of the aid received and the classification of the dismissal as null and void.

In addition, the deadline for companies with more than 200 employees, or more than 100 employees per shift, to comply with the obligation to implement sustainable commuting‑to‑work mobility plans is brought forward by twelve months, through an amendment to Article 26 of Law 9/2025 of 3 December on Sustainable Mobility. The new deadline is therefore set at 5 December 2026, pursuant to Article 63 of Royal Decree‑law 7/2026. Furthermore, an additional penalty is introduced for companies benefiting from the direct aid provided for under Royal Decree‑law 7/2026: failure to comply with the obligation to have sustainable mobility plans in place within the prescribed time limit will entail repayment of the aid received (Article 64).

Act 10/2025 of 26 December on Customer Service introduces a reference regulatory framework that strengthens consumer and user protection standards in Spain, with a direct and significant impact on the financial sector. Among its most relevant implications is the extension of the subjective scope of Act 44/2002, which broadens the obligation to have a Customer Service Department to new entities —including payment institutions, management companies of collective investment undertakings, insurance brokers, real estate lenders and credit intermediaries— as well as the incorporation of enhanced requirements relating to accessibility, free‑of‑charge service provision, support for vulnerable persons and functional separation from commercial areas.

Entities subject to the Act have a 12‑month adaptation period from its entry into force —expiring on 28 December 2026— to adjust their internal structures, customer service channels, complaints‑handling procedures and transparency obligations to the requirements of the Customer Service Act. In this context, specialised legal advice is essential to ensure full regulatory compliance, minimise supervisory risk and anticipate the implications arising from the future establishment of the Financial Customer Protection Authority.

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The First Chamber of the Supreme Court has handed down Judgment No. 161/2026, of 4 February, in which it declares that the remuneration interest clause of a mortgage loan granted to a property developer did not pass the incorporation control provided for in Articles 5 and 7 of the Law on General Contracting Conditions (LCGC), as the purchasers were not provided with sufficient and comprehensible information on the applicable interest rate — referenced to the IRPH-Entidades — prior to their subrogation.

The ruling reinforces the pre-contractual duty of disclosure of credit institutions towards purchasers who have assumed pre-existing mortgage loans, with the Supreme Court specifying that a generic reference to the terms of the developer's loan does not constitute effective knowledge thereof, and that delivery of a full copy or express transcription of its clauses is required.

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In this information alert, we provide a summary of several recent judicial decisions addressing key issues in the field of employment law. These decisions, issued in late 2025 and early 2026, deal with matters relating to unpaid parental leave under Article 48 bis of the Workers' Statute (accrual of annual leave and use in weekly periods); the impact of situations of temporary incapacity or paid leave for work-life balance purposes on variable remuneration; the priority of application of the sectoral collective agreement over the company-level agreement in matters of pay; and the non-applicability of the substantial modification of working conditions procedure where changes are covered by a collective agreement. Through these Supreme Court judgments, important implications for companies and workers are set out, as well as the current interpretations of employment legislation in Spain.

Case Law Developments

Supreme Court Judgment of 26 January 2026 (Appeal No. 205/2024)

The Supreme Court rules on the appeal on points of law against the judgment of the High Court of Justice of Catalonia No. 18/2024, of 30 April 2024, which held that, in the case of use of the unpaid parental leave regulated under Article 48 bis of the Workers' Statute, no annual leave accrued during that period, and that such leave must be taken in full weeks.

In response to that appeal, the Supreme Court confirms the criterion of the High Court of Justice of Catalonia to the effect that parental leave must be taken in full weeks, since, from the literal wording of the provision, it is clear that it is taken by weeks, and may not be taken in periods of less than one week.

That interpretation is not contrary to Directive (EU) 2019/1158 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on work-life balance for parents and carers, given that the Directive allows each Member State to determine whether it is expressed in days, weeks or other units of time.

However, the High Court does not dismiss the appeal in its entirety, but rather partially upholds the appeal on points of law, and establishes that, in the case of use of parental leave regulated under Article 48 bis of the Workers' Statute, even though it constitutes a suspension of the employment contract and is unpaid in nature, annual leave days do accrue during the period of use of such leave, which must be considered an exception to the general rule, and must therefore be classified as effective working time, with the same treatment as that established for birth and childcare leave.

Supreme Court Judgment of 16 January 2026 (Appeal No. 2/2025)

The Supreme Court rules on an appeal on points of law relating to a collective dispute, the purpose of which is to determine whether the employer's practice of discounting from the count of productive working days — for the purposes of variable remuneration — those days on which the employee was unable to provide services due to temporary incapacity, as well as those days on which services were not rendered due to the use of paid leave regulated under Article 37.3 of the Workers' Statute, is discriminatory.

The company applied a variable remuneration system that set out certain conditions the employee was required to meet in order to access the incentive, one of which was that the employee must have provided services on a certain number of "productive working days" during the incentive accrual period. The company did not count as productive working days, for the purposes of variable remuneration, periods of temporary incapacity or days on which the leave provided for under Article 37.3(b), (e) and (f) of the Workers' Statute was used.

The Social Chamber of the Supreme Court declares null and void the employer's decision to classify as non-productive, for the purposes of payment of variable remuneration, those working days on which the employee was unable to provide services due to temporary incapacity, as well as those working days on which the employee did not provide services because they used the paid leave recognised under Article 37.3(b), (e) and (f) of the Workers' Statute.

Whilst the Court acknowledges that combating absenteeism constitutes a legitimate aim, absenteeism must be combated without breaching the legal order. This means that the absences which may be taken into account for these purposes cannot be caused by illness or by the aforementioned work-life balance measures, insofar as such conduct must be considered discriminatory and contrary to the legal order.

Unjustified absences may be counted, as may absences arising from leave that does not constitute prohibited discrimination. For example, absences due to a change of habitual residence or to sit examinations may be counted for these purposes, insofar as they do not cause discrimination.

Supreme Court Judgment of 18 December 2025 (Appeal No. 158/2024)

The Social Chamber of the Supreme Court has handed down a judgment of considerable importance, establishing — in a manner that is certainly open to question — a new interpretative criterion regarding the priority of application of collective agreements in matters of pay.

On this matter, Royal Decree-Law 32/2021, of 28 December, on urgent measures for labour reform, employment stability and labour market transformation, repealed Article 84.2(a) of the Workers' Statute, which had established the priority of application of the company-level collective agreement in matters of pay, regardless of whether it was subsequent to a collective agreement of another scope. In addition, an adaptation period was established for company-level collective agreements to align with sectoral collective agreements in matters of pay.

Following that regulatory change, the National High Court ruled on a claim seeking the annulment of a company-level collective agreement for establishing a salary below that of the sectoral collective agreement, despite the adaptation period having already expired. The National High Court declared that, since the challenged company-level collective agreement pre-dated the sectoral collective agreement, the company-level agreement should maintain its priority of application in matters of pay, given that, notwithstanding the amendment to Article 84.2 of the Workers' Statute, Article 84.1 of the same text remains in force, establishing the temporal priority of application of collective agreements, whereby priority is given to the agreement that was concluded first in time.

However, upon the filing of the relevant appeal, that judgment was overturned by the Supreme Court, which interpreted that the amendment to Article 84.2 of the Workers' Statute entails that, since no legal priority of application in matters of pay is established for company-level collective agreements, the priority of application in matters of pay belongs to the sectoral collective agreement.

It is true that this criterion is certainly open to question, particularly given that the Supreme Court acknowledges that the company-level collective agreement was concluded first in time, as it disregards the fact that the temporal priority of application provided for in Article 84.1 of the Workers' Statute remains in force. It will therefore be essential to ascertain whether the High Court consolidates this criterion in subsequent judicial pronouncements.

Supreme Court Judgment of 13 November 2025 (Appeal No. 174/2024)

The Supreme Court rules on the appeal on points of law brought by a trade union against the judgment of the High Court of Justice of the Basque Country (11 July 2023), handed down in collective dispute proceedings following a business succession (DISU taking over staff from Superberriak). The trade union maintained that the introduction, from February 2023, of Saturday afternoon working at the transferred establishments constituted a substantial modification of working conditions and required the procedure under Article 41 of the Workers' Statute (consultation period) to be followed, and further sought reinstatement of conditions, payment as overtime and compensation for moral damages on grounds of an alleged breach of trade union freedom/collective bargaining.

The Supreme Court upholds the dismissal because the key issue is not merely whether the change would "fall within" Article 41 of the Workers' Statute, but rather that there is a collective agreement concluded in the course of the succession negotiations themselves, under which the representatives of the transferred employees fully adhered to the collective conditions of DISU (by territory), rendering the previous collective conditions without effect (save for individual respect for salaries), and accepting that the organisation of working time (annual hours, calendars and distribution) would be governed by DISU's usual procedures, with gradual adaptation during a transitional period. Interpreting that agreement in accordance with the criteria applicable to its normative effectiveness, the Chamber considers it reasonable to conclude that the measure (Saturday afternoons) falls within the agreed framework.

Accordingly, the Court establishes that the substantial modification of working conditions procedure under Article 41 of the Workers' Statute is required where there is a unilateral employer decision altering working conditions; however, where the measure is provided for or authorised by a valid and unchallenged collective agreement, there is no substantial modification of working conditions, but rather the implementation of what has been agreed. Since the principal ground is not upheld, the claim of infringement of fundamental rights (breach of trade union freedom/collective bargaining), which was based on the foregoing, is likewise not upheld.

Consequently, the Supreme Court dismisses the appeal, upholding the judgment of the High Court of Justice of the Basque Country.

National High Court Judgment of 19 January 2026 (Appeal No. 291/2025)

The Social Chamber of the National High Court, in the context of collective dispute proceedings, has ruled on a matter of particular procedural significance, namely the interpretation of Article 82.5 of the Act Regulating Social Jurisdiction, which requires that documentary and expert evidence which the parties intend to rely upon be submitted at least ten working days before the hearing.

In the specific case, the hearing was scheduled for Tuesday 18 November 2025, with Monday 10 November 2025 being a public holiday in Madrid, and the evidence was submitted on 4 November at 18:36.

Given those facts, the National High Court interprets that the evidence was submitted out of time, since the ten-day period must not be calculated date-to-date but rather there must be ten full days between the date of the hearing and the date of submission; therefore, since 10 November 2025 was a public holiday, the ten-day period expired on Monday 3 November 2025, meaning the last day for submission of evidence was Friday 31 October 2025. Thus, although the grace period provided for under Article 45 of the Act Regulating Social Jurisdiction is applicable to this time limit — thereby allowing submission on the following day until 15:00 — the deadline expired on 3 November 2025 at the time indicated, so that the evidence was submitted out of time and must accordingly be declared inadmissible.

It will be essential to ascertain whether the High Court confirms or rejects this criterion, which is not yet settled.

High Court of Justice of Catalonia Judgment of 28 November 2025 (Appeal No. 30/2025)

The High Court of Justice of Catalonia rules on a collective dispute brought by UGT against Parc Sanitari Sant Joan de Déu, concerning the interpretation of two paid leave entitlements following the reform introduced by Royal Decree-Law 5/2023 of 28 June, adopting and extending certain measures in response to the economic and social consequences of the war in Ukraine, supporting the reconstruction of the island of La Palma and other situations of vulnerability, transposing European Union Directives on structural modifications of commercial companies and work-life balance for parents and carers, and implementing and complying with European Union law; specifically, hospitalisation leave for a family member and force majeure leave.

Regarding hospitalisation leave, the Court holds that "hospital discharge" does not automatically extinguish the leave if it is not accompanied by "medical discharge", as it is the latter that marks the disappearance of the causative event that gave rise to the leave. Accordingly, following hospital discharge the employee will only retain the leave entitlement if prescribed home rest for the hospitalised family member. As regards the force majeure leave regulated under Article 37.9 of the Workers' Statute, the Court declares that the exercise of this right does not require the employee to have already started their working day, and is equally valid where the family emergency arises before the employee has actually reported for work.

Legislative Developments

Royal Decree 126/2026, of 18 February, setting the national minimum wage for 2026

The national minimum wage for 2026 is set at €40.70 gross per day or, equivalently, €1,221 gross per month across the 14 statutory pay periods (€17,094 gross per year). This amount, which constitutes the minimum applicable to any employment activity, refers exclusively to monetary remuneration and does not include remuneration in kind. The revision of the national minimum wage does not affect the structure or amount of salaries already being received by employees where such salaries, taken as a whole and calculated on an annual basis, exceed the national minimum wage, and the rules on offsetting and absorption established under Article 26.5 of the Workers' Statute remain unaltered.

Specific provisions are also made for employees with fixed-term employment contracts whose services to the same employer do not exceed one hundred and twenty days, and for household employees.

Other Developments of Interest

Management Criterion 5/2026 of the Sub-Directorate General for Social Security Benefits Organisation and Legal Assistance of the INSS

This criterion concerns the simultaneous exercise of employment activity in Spain and in one or more other States within the scope of application of the Community Regulations on the coordination of social security systems, and the treatment — for the purposes of the recognition and calculation of social security benefits — to be given to Spanish contributions that overlap with insurance periods certified by another State.

The starting point is the following premise: Article 13 of Regulation (EC) 883/2024 determines which legislation is applicable to a person who simultaneously exercises activities in two or more Member States, and this will be the legislation of a single Member State. Accordingly, compulsory double insurance coverage gives rise to a duplication that is not permitted.

This Criterion establishes that, if the General Social Security Treasury determines that Spanish legislation was not the applicable one, the contributions made in Spain during the overlapping period must not be taken into account either for the calculation of the national pension or for calculating the pro-rata percentage chargeable to Spain, since they were paid in breach of Community rules. That period will be counted as covered under the legislation of the other Member State; and this applies regardless of whether or not the contributions paid into the Spanish social security system can be refunded, and regardless of whether or not the Treasury considers them valid within the scope of its competencies.

On 7 January 2026, the Council of Ministers approved the Draft Bill on Consumer Credit Agreements, which is currently being processed following the public consultation period. This reform transposes the European directives on consumer credit and distance financial services, transforming the regulatory framework for the sector.

Among the main new features are:

• Provisional cap of 22 percentage points for the APR on consumer credit, including existing revolving card transactions

• Reservation of activity: only entities authorised and supervised by the Bank of Spain may grant credit, introducing two new categories of operators: EFCALs (Limited Scope Credit Institutions) and authorised high-cost lenders

• Special regime for high-cost loans (those exceeding the market average by 10 points): monthly limit of 4%, minimum of 3 monthly payments and 24-hour cooling-off period before signing

• Transparency in distance contracts: obligation to include a visible withdrawal function and express prohibition of manipulative practices (dark patterns)

• Mandatory credit history check for high-cost loans to prevent over-indebtedness

• Full legal nullity for contracts granted by unauthorised operators

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In this information alert, we provide a summary of several recent court rulings addressing key issues in the field of labour law. These decisions, issued between October and November 2025, deal with issues such as the right to data protection when using company digital devices, the legitimacy of trade unions to bring legal action on behalf of workers, and the activation of contributions to the Treasury in the event of collective redundancies. These rulings from various judicial bodies, including the European Court of Human Rights, the Supreme Court, and the High Courts of Justice, outline important implications for companies and workers, as well as the current interpretations of labour regulations in Spain.

New case law developments

Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 6 November 2025 (Guyvan v. Ukraine)

The Guyvan v. Ukraine case concerns a dispute between an employee and his employer, who accessed detailed data from his work mobile phone, a device he used not only for work purposes but also for private purposes, in order to check whether he was at his workplace. The Ukrainian courts rejected the employee's claim on the grounds that the data was "technical" and not personal, and therefore there was no evidence of a breach of data protection regulations, specifically Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (hereinafter, the "Convention"). However, the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter, the "ECHR") concluded that the information obtained by the employer went beyond the data necessary to determine whether the employee had been at work, as it had accessed the employee's specific location, the contact numbers with which he had made calls, the duration of the calls, the use of roaming, etc. Furthermore, the ECHR emphasises that, although this was a dispute between an employee and a private company, and therefore at first glance it might appear that the State was not directly involved, the State has an obligation to ensure that the courts respect the rights protected by Article 8 of the Convention. In conclusion, the ECHR ruled that Ukraine had failed to comply with the positive obligations arising from the aforementioned article. 

Supreme Court ruling of 12 November 2025 (rec. no. 52/2024)

The Supreme Court is asked to rule on whether, in a case where the requirements are met for a company to make contributions to the Treasury as a result of a collective dismissal affecting a percentage of workers aged 50 or over that is higher than the percentage of workers aged 50 or over who are part of the workforce, the company can be exempted from this obligation on grounds not expressly provided for in the legislation. expressly provided for in the regulations.

On this issue, it is important to note that the High Court of Justice of Catalonia had upheld the company's appeal against the SEPE's decision, interpreting that there had been no intention on the part of the company to get rid of older workers in order to save costs and that the payment of settlements relating to contributions to the Treasury, taking into account the company's negative economic situation, would lead to its bankruptcy, with the need to dismiss all workers, increasing the expenditure on unemployment benefits, which would be an interpretation totally contrary to the spirit of the regulations on the matter.

However, the High Court, in response to the appeal lodged by the SEPE, overturned the ruling of the High Court of Justice of Catalonia and established that, regardless of whether or not it agreed with the arguments of the plaintiff company regarding the purpose of the regulation, in order for these arguments to be upheld, they would need to be framed within the application or interpretation of the specific legal regulation, there being no specific provision establishing a possible exemption from the obligation for the reasons expressly alleged, nor could such a possibility be interpreted.

Supreme Court ruling of 22 October 2025 (rec. no. 5478/2023)

A worker claimed wage differences on the grounds that the toxicity bonus under Article 6 of the Provincial Collective Agreement on Building and Premises Cleaning in Bizkaia should be paid per calendar day and not only for days actually worked. The Social Court No. 11 of Bilbao only recognised seniority and rejected the wage differences arising from the application of this bonus, while the High Court of Justice of the Basque Country overturned this ruling on appeal, ordering the payment of the bonus per calendar day, which led to the company filing an appeal for the unification of doctrine. The Supreme Court took up the debate, identifying the appealed ruling and the appealing company, and conducted a contradictory review with Supreme Court Ruling No. 443/2023 on the same Article 6 of the same agreement, which had previously established that the appropriate interpretation was payment for days actually worked. In response to the argument that the percentage of the bonus "on top of the base salary" would imply monthly accrual per calendar day, the High Court recalls that the toxicity bonus is a job supplement covered by Article 26.3 of the Workers' Statute, which compensates for the provision of services in working conditions with a risk of toxicity and is not consolidated; so that, unless the collective agreement governing the specific bonus states otherwise, it is only accrued when the service is actually provided under those conditions. With this interpretative guideline, and noting that the wording of Article 6 does not contain a special rule for accrual per "calendar day", the judgment of the High Court of Justice of the Basque Country is overturned and the judgment of the court of first instance is upheld, unifying doctrine and concluding that the bonus is paid for days actually worked, and not for calendar days.

Supreme Court ruling of 6 October 2025 (appeal no. 1949/2024)

The Supreme Court rules on an appeal for the unification of doctrine in which it analyses the scope of a trade union's standing to sue, questioning whether, in the event that a worker affiliated to the union has not claimed a violation of fundamental rights, the union can claim autonomously through the procedure for the protection of fundamental rights, or whether it is only possible for it to be a party as an intervener.

In the specific case, a worker who was a member of the trade union had been transferred from one workplace to another in a context in which the worker had requested that masks be distributed among the staff in the days prior to the transfer. Therefore, the union, through the procedure for the protection of trade union freedom, demanded that the anti-union conduct cease, that the worker be immediately reinstated to their job and that they be compensated with €7,501. However, it should be noted that the worker had not made an individual and personal complaint regarding the transfer.

After analysing the difference between individual and collective interests, the Supreme Court established that in this specific case there was a clear connection between the worker's prior complaint and the notification of the transfer, therefore, there is a collective interest on the part of the trade union in obtaining a ruling declaring the cessation of anti-union conduct, with the trade union having standing to claim such cessation through the procedure for the protection of trade union freedom, as well as claiming moral damages arising from such a violation of a fundamental right, but lacking standing to claim the reinstatement of the worker to the job he held prior to the transfer carried out by the company.

Judgment of the High Court of Justice of Galicia of 9 September 2025 (rec. no. 2069/2025)

In January 2020, the claimant took sick leave due to major depressive disorder. After a procedure before the INSS, which rejected her claim for disability, she applied to the court for recognition of total permanent disability for her usual profession, which was branch manager at a bank. In March 2023, she took up an adapted position at the company's head office, performing administrative and back-office duties, receiving a positive performance evaluation and a medical report that considered her fit for work with limitations. 

In April 2024, the Social Court recognised her disability based on her depressive disorder and a fibula fracture suffered in 2021, and the claimant requested the adaptation of her job following the disability ruling. However, in May 2024, the company informed her of her dismissal, and the worker filed a lawsuit against the termination of her employment contract, alleging that it was a null and void dismissal based on discrimination on the grounds of disability.

The Chamber confirmed the nullity of the dismissal, considering that the worker is a person with a disability and that the company should have kept her in an adapted position, in accordance with the obligation to make reasonable adjustments established in the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities ( ) Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, and the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The Chamber rejected the company's arguments regarding the alleged impossibility of performing any job, as the proven facts show that the worker successfully performed the tasks of her adapted position without excessive burden on the company, and concludes that the company violated the principle of equal treatment and that, therefore, it should reinstate the worker in an adapted position, respecting her right to work and to remuneration in accordance with the applicable regulations.

It also recognised that discrimination on the grounds of disability justified the payment of the €30,000 in compensation claimed, as well as the payment of the wages not received from the date of dismissal until reinstatement, with legal interest. 

Judgment of the High Court of Justice of Madrid of 11 July 2025 (rec. no. 396/2025)

A worker appealed against the ruling of Madrid Social Court No. 47, which denied the classification as paid leave due to force majeure (Article 37.9 of the Workers' Statute) of his absences due to the sudden illness of his minor daughter and which, in addition, improperly counted the Saturday in the hospitalisation leave.

In response to this appeal, the High Court of Justice of Madrid corrected the lower court's ruling and declared that the real reason for the absence was not "going to the health centre" but rather a family emergency that required the immediate presence of the parent. Thus, it cannot be ignored that three requirements must be met: (i) an urgent and unexpected family reason requiring immediate presence, (ii) illness or accident of a family member/cohabitant requiring assistance, and (iii) the indispensability of the worker's presence due to the lack of a reasonable alternative. 

Taking these requirements into account, the worker's absences are covered and remunerated. In addition, the High Court of Justice of Madrid adds that neither Article 37.9 of the Workers' Statute limits the right to "individual hours" nor does it require "absolute" unpredictability. 

Similarly, with regard to the issue relating to Article 37.3.b) of the Workers' Statute (hospitalisation), it establishes that the triggering event is admission to hospital and that the leave is calculated in terms of the worker's actual working days, so that, as their working week is from Monday to Friday, Saturday does not count as a day of leave. 

Finally, it finds a violation of Article 14 of the Spanish Constitution due to the company's failure to comply with a criterion that has already been unified in collective disputes and orders the payment of €3,500 in moral damages pursuant to Article 183 of the Law Regulating Social Jurisdiction. 

Legislative developments

Law 9/2025, of 3 December, on sustainable mobility

This Law sets out new labour obligations for companies. Specifically, those with a workplace with 200 employees or 100 per shift must draw up a sustainable mobility plan for the workplace no later than 5 December 2027. These plans must be negotiated with the legal representatives of the employees (or with a trade union negotiating committee, if there is no legal representation). They must include solutions that consider, for example, the promotion of active mobility, collective transport, low-emission mobility, shared/collaborative mobility solutions, solutions to facilitate the use and recharging of zero-emission vehicles, and teleworking where possible, among other issues. Measures relating to the improvement of road safety and accident prevention when travelling to the workplace will also be included. Sustainable mobility plans for work must be registered and monitored to assess the level of implementation of the actions and measures included in the plan. In any case, within two years of its approval, a monitoring report must be prepared, which will be repeated every two years during the plan's validity.

Other news of interest

RED Newsletter 11/2025, 26 November

This Bulletin includes aspects of general interest to companies relating to: (i) special deferrals DANA RDL 6/2024; (ii) Article 235 of the General Social Security Law on contribution periods assimilated for childbirth for the purposes of exemption from contributions under Articles 152 and 311; (iii) Royal Decree-Law 9/2025, of 29 July, extending birth and childcare leave: two additional weeks of birth and childcare benefits; (iv) IT reports - obligation to notify the INSS of "job position" and "job description"; and (v) INSS communication on the regulatory basis for temporary disability.

In this information alert, we provide a summary of several recent court rulings addressing key issues in the labour field. These decisions, issued in September 2025, deal with issues such as the guarantee of compensation in the event of dismissal, whether or not parental leave under Article 48.bis ET is remunerated, and the right to telework in order to care for a family member with a disability as an adjustment to working hours under Article 34.8 ET, among others. These rulings have important implications for companies and workers, as well as current interpretations of Spanish labour regulations.

Recent jurisprudential developments 

Judgment of the Constitutional Court (Plenary Session) of 9 September 2025 (rec. no. 1186/2024)

The Constitutional Court is analysing whether the guarantee of indemnity applies to cases in which the worker does not make a claim directly against the company, either in or out of court, but instead makes the claim to the workers' legal representative so that the latter can forward the claim.

In the specific case analysed, on 11 August 2021, the worker sent a letter to the chair of the works council stating that he had been assigned to work a shift in Lanzarote that he was not supposed to work because, according to the weekly schedule, he had been assigned to work in Las Palmas de Gran Canaria. 

As a result of the above, the following day, 12 August 2021, the chair of the works council met with the company and managed to have the change to the schedule revoked, but on 28 August 2021, the company informed the worker that their contract was being terminated for objective reasons arising from the termination of the contract with the client. A new multi-service framework agreement with the aforementioned client has been in place since 1 August 2021. 

To resolve this issue, the Constitutional Court conducts an in-depth and extensive analysis of the various rulings of the aforementioned constitutional body on the subject of indemnity guarantees, highlighting how the application of this guarantee has been extended to cases in which no legal action has been taken, but preparatory acts have been carried out with a view to taking legal action, as well as to cases in which the company has not been sued directly, but a complaint has been filed through the Labour and Social Security Inspectorate. In view of the above, the Constitutional Court interprets that the legal representation of workers is recognised by law as having the function of monitoring compliance with labour legislation (Art. 64.7.a).1 of the Workers' Statute), as well as the exercise of legal actions against the company, so that it is an appropriate means of resolving disputes that may arise between workers and the company, and therefore constitutes a useful system for avoiding legal proceedings, provided that the complaint is reported to the workers' legal representatives so that they can address the company with regard to said claim. 

Therefore, the application of the guarantee of indemnity is recognised for complaints made to the workers' representatives so that This Alert is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice of any kind. act as an intermediary with the company, since interpreting otherwise would undermine the constitutional protection of the right to effective judicial protection. 

It is important to bear in mind the provisions of Additional Provision 3 of Organic Law 5/2024 of 11 November on the Right of Defence, which, although not applicable to the specific case for reasons of timing, affirms the broad scope of the guarantee of indemnity:  "1. Workers have the right to indemnity against any adverse consequences they may suffer as a result of any action taken before the company or before an administrative or judicial body to claim their labour rights, whether taken by themselves or by their legal representatives. 2. This protection extends to spouses, civil partners and relatives up to the second degree of consanguinity or affinity who work for the same company, even if they have not taken the action leading to the exercise of their rights."

Supreme Court ruling of 24 September 2025 (appeal no. 917/2024)

The Social Chamber of the Supreme Court has ruled on the appeal for unification of doctrine that was filed against a ruling by the High Court of Justice of Asturias, which had recognised a worker's right to enjoy the requested adjustment to their working hours on the grounds that the company had not complied with the negotiation obligation provided for in Article 34.8 of the Workers' Statute, but had merely rejected the request. 

Therefore, the subject of the dispute is whether the fact that there has been no negotiation period in which the company has made proposals, but has merely rejected the request made, even if the rejection is justified, means that the request for adjustment of working hours must be granted. 

In response to this question, the Social Chamber of the Supreme Court interprets that the opening of the negotiation period is established in law as a mandatory procedure for the company, and that its omission must have legal consequences with regard to the acceptance of the requested working hours adjustment measures in the event of a legal challenge. 

In this sense, the very concept of negotiation must imply that the company genuinely attempts to initiate a debate with the other party on the possibility or impossibility of granting the requested adjustment. 

Thus, although nothing would prevent the company from directly accepting the proposal made by the worker, thereby fulfilling the requirement for negotiation on the spot, if this is not the case, a period of negotiation must be initiated, which the legislator has not configured as a simple formality, but as a genuine negotiation aimed at reaching This Alert is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice of any kind. an agreement through proposals and counterproposals, respecting the principle of good faith in negotiations. 

Therefore, the law does not allow the company to respond directly to the request with a rejection, even in cases where there are grounds for doing so, or even by offering alternative proposals, as this would constitute a circumvention of the obligation to open a period of negotiation, which is expressly established in Article 34.8 of the Workers' Statute.

Consequently, the absence of negotiation entails the acceptance of the worker's request for an adjustment to their working hours, with the sole exception of those cases in which the judicial body ruling on the matter interprets that the request for an adjustment to working hours is manifestly unreasonable or disproportionate.

Supreme Court ruling of 9 September 2025 (appeal no. 99/2025)

The collective dispute arose from the interpretation of the concept of "summer period" provided for in the Third State Collective Agreement for the Contact Centre Sector (BOE of 14 March 2023), following the holiday regulations imposed unilaterally by the company. 

The trade unions claimed that the summer period, during which workers must enjoy at least two weeks of continuous holidays, should run from the summer solstice to the autumn equinox (in 2025, from 21 June to 21 September). The company, on the other hand, had unilaterally defined the period between 9 June and 14 September 2025. 

The National Court upheld the claims filed by the trade union and declared the company regulations null and void insofar as they altered the summer period, arguing that the definition of the agreement does not allow for unilateral modification and must respect traditional practice and the literal meaning of the term "summer" according to its astronomical and socially accepted meaning. 

The Supreme Court upheld the lower court's ruling, emphasising that collective agreements must be interpreted according to literal, systematic, historical and finalistic criteria, taking into account the intention of the negotiators and the regulatory function of collective agreements. It also considered that the company could not unilaterally alter the dates of the summer period, as the setting of holidays requires agreement between the company and the workers. The purpose of this summer period is to ensure that holidays coincide with the traditional summer season, promoting rest, family reconciliation and harmony with the school calendar. Therefore, the dates proposed by the company do not respect either the literal wording of the agreement or historical sectoral practice, and their imposition lacks sufficient legal basis. 

In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismisses the appeal filed by the employer and upholds the ruling of the National Court, establishing the concept of the summer period from the summer solstice to the autumn equinox, and confirming that the summer period must be defined reasonably, in accordance with the agreement and sectoral tradition, without the possibility of unilateral modification by the company. 

Supreme Court ruling of 10 September 2025 (appeal no. 813/2023) 

The Supreme Court dismisses the appeal for unification of doctrine filed by a worker against the Canary Islands Accident Mutual Insurance Company (MAC) and the INSS, confirming the termination of her Temporary Disability (IT) benefit. The controversy revolves around whether the worker, who was on sick leave due to meniscal injury, had sufficiently justified her failure to attend a medical examination called by the Mutual Insurance Company on 27 August 2021. The worker had been informed that, in the event of failure to attend the examination, her IT benefit would be suspended as a precautionary measure, and if she did not justify her absence within 10 days, the benefit would be terminated. 

The interested party claimed that, after suffering a fall the previous day, a doctor prescribed complete rest for 48 hours, providing the corresponding medical certificate, but outside the legal period of ten days provided for in Article 9 of Royal Decree 625/2014. 

The Supreme Court ruling fully confirms the ruling of the High Court of Justice of the Canary Islands and declares it final. In this regard, the Supreme Court emphasises that the aforementioned period is decisive: the justification must be provided before or within ten working days of the appointment to avoid the termination of the benefit. In this case, the worker did not notify by telephone that she was unable to attend, nor did she provide the documentation on time, which, according to the Chamber, demonstrates a lack of diligence required in this type of situation. 

The Court also ruled out any contradiction with the 2015 ruling of the High Court of Justice of Galicia, cited as a reference, since in that case the worker, through her son, did immediately notify the Mutual Insurance Company and submitted medical justification within the ten-day period. The Supreme Court thus reaffirms its doctrine: unjustified failure to appear or failure to notify within the ten-day period constitutes valid grounds for termination of the right to temporary disability benefits.

Judgment of the National Court of 30 September 2025 (rec. no. 231/2025)

The Social Chamber of the National Court resolves a collective dispute brought by various trade unions claiming that parental leave regulated in Article 48.bis of the Workers' Statute should be declared remunerated, as a result of Directive (EU) 2019/1158 of the European Parliament. 

European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on work-life balance for parents and carers, which is the rule from which it derives, has not been correctly transposed into our domestic legal system within the established time limit, as the paid nature of such leave has not been provided for, so that the Directive must be applied directly. 

The defendant group of companies opposes this claim on the grounds that it is not of a remunerative nature, as it was conceived as a case of suspension of the contract pursuant to Article 45.1 o) of the Workers' Statute, and the Directive cannot be directly effective because it is not admissible in relations between private individuals. 

In view of these positions, the Social Chamber of the National Court analyses the set of leave provisions established in Spanish law, highlighting that there is currently eight weeks' parental leave in Article 48.bis of the Workers' Statute, which is not financially supported, either privately or publicly, three weeks' breastfeeding leave on average for accumulated hours in Article 37.4 of the Workers' Statute, which is paid for by the company, and a nineteen-week suspension for birth or adoption (following the latest reform) in sections 4 and 5 of Article 48 of the Workers' Statute, of which at least five weeks are dedicated to caring for the child and are financially supported (this conclusion is reached because the generic group of biological mothers is recognized within that period of nineteen weeks, fourteen weeks derived from compliance in our legal system with Article 8 of Council Directive 92/85/ of 19 October 1992, which means that, after deducting those fourteen weeks, the biological mother has five weeks for the care of the child. For other groups, the duration of the suspension linked to the care of the child is longer). 

Therefore, the legal system as a whole establishes eight weeks of parental leave that is not financially covered – either through remuneration or financial benefits – and eight weeks of leave that is either well remunerated or covered by financial benefits. Therefore, at present, Directive (EU) 2019/1158 has been correctly transposed, and the paid nature of parental leave regulated in Article 48.bis of the Workers' Statute must be rejected. For the period prior to the latest reform implemented by Royal Decree-Law 9/2025 of 29 July, the purpose of which was precisely to complete the transposition of the aforementioned Directive, the possibility of direct application is rejected.

Judgment of the High Court of Justice of Galicia of 5 September 2025 (rec. 3945/2024)

The High Court of Justice of Galicia hears an appeal for a request to work remotely (in the form of teleworking) in order to more easily care for the appellant's mother, who has Parkinson's disease. The appellant, a telemarketer, had been providing services on a teleworking basis. However, on 16 January 2024, the company informed her that, as of 19 February, she would have to continue providing her services in person. The worker's reaction was to request teleworking under Article 34.8 ET on 2 February 2024. Initially, the company responded that teleworking was not possible for the project to which she was assigned, but that it would try to see if it was possible to assign her to other projects. Later, as a final response, the company claimed that in the projects to which the employee could be assigned, the work was either "in-person" or there was "oversizing". The High Court of Justice emphasised that the company did not offer the employee any alternative (such as combining teleworking with on-site work) and chose to deny her the possibility of teleworking.

However, for the High Court, the reasons for the refusal (the need for on-site work and overstaffing) were not substantiated, especially considering that she had been working remotely until then. Therefore, it upheld the appeal and ordered the company to recognise teleworking and to compensate the worker with €3,750 for moral damages. 

In this information alert, we provide a summary of several recent court rulings addressing key issues in the labour field. These decisions, issued between June and september 2025, address key topics in the field of employment law, including the guiding principles of the gradualist theory in disciplinary matters, in itinere accidents, the classification of voluntary resignation, and the right to algorithmic information. These judgments outline significant implications for companies and workers, as well as current interpretations of Spanish labour regulations.

We also highlight several legislative developments, including the extension of parental leave to 19 weeks per parent, the approval of the 2025–2027 Strategic Plan of the Labour and Social Security Inspectorate (ITSS), and Order PJC/908/2025, which sets the date for the entry into operation of the Independent Authority for Whistleblower Protection.

Case Law Developments

Supreme Court Judgment of 10 September 2025 (Case No. 14/2024)
The Supreme Court dismissed UGT’s claim against the company and upheld the National Court’s ruling, considering that an ergonomic chair is not an essential working condition but a preventive measure subject to risk assessment and individual circumstances. It held that the teleworking agreement already provided for basic equipment (laptop, charger, mouse, and headset) and a monthly allowance of €30 for expenses, excluding the ergonomic chair; that there was a procedure in place through the prevention service to request ergonomic items (monitor, keyboard, footrest), and that the chair was only provided with a validated medical prescription; that general ergonomic risk does not require the provision of chairs to the entire workforce without individual assessment; and that the company complied with Law 10/2021 and occupational health and safety regulations. Therefore, there was no breach of the principle of equality nor any obligation to provide chairs indiscriminately to teleworkers.

Supreme Court Judgment of 2 June 2025 (Case No. 813/2023)
An employee, while leaving their detached house for work, slipped on the steps of their porch at around 7:30 a.m., without having exited their property, with their working day due to start at 8:00 a.m. As a result of the fall, the employee suffered a temporary incapacity classified as a common contingency. Disagreeing with this classification, the employee initiated administrative and legal proceedings to have the incapacity recognised as a professional contingency, arguing that it was an in itinere accident. The Supreme Court therefore assessed whether the accident was of a personal or professional nature. The High Court of Justice of Murcia, which heard the appeal, considered the accident to be work-related. However, the Supreme Court held that for an in itinere accident to exist, as set out in Article 156 of the General Social Security Law, the individual must have left the detached house and accessed public space. In this specific case, the Court found that the employee had the ability to minimise risks within their own property, which includes all interior areas not considered public space (such as the garden or porch). Therefore, since the accident occurred before the employee had entered public space—where risks are beyond personal control—it could not be classified as an in itinere accident, and the contingency was deemed common.

Judgment of the High Court of Justice of Madrid, 11 June 2025 (Case No. 113/2025)
An employee filed a claim requesting payment of €5,718.41, including 10% interest for late payment under Article 29.3 of the Workers’ Statute. The total amount claimed related to unpaid variable remuneration, profit-sharing, and bonus payments. The Labour Court No. 17 of Madrid ruled in favour of the employee, relying on the fictia confessio under Article 91.2 of the Law Regulating Social Jurisdiction (LRJS). During the hearing, the company was questioned through its legal representative, who held power of attorney but had no direct knowledge of the facts. The company appealed the ruling, requesting its annulment due to incorrect application of the fictia confessio.

The High Court of Justice of Madrid agreed that the questioning should not have been conducted by an external lawyer lacking direct knowledge of the facts, whose understanding was based solely on information provided by the client. It held that, under Article 91.5 LRJS, questioning must be carried out by someone who acted on behalf of the company and was directly involved in the events. The court stated that it is not acceptable for a lawyer, who merely holds power of representation and has no managerial or operational role within the company, to respond to questioning, as the procedural rules require direct knowledge of the facts.

However, the court also found that the lower court had misapplied the fictia confessio, as it must be applied to facts, not legal conclusions. The judge had ruled in favour of the employee without considering the company’s arguments or the proven facts that showed partial payments had already been made. As a result, the court held that the company’s right to effective judicial protection had been violated, annulled the original judgment, and ordered a retrial.

Judgment of the High Court of Justice of Catalonia, 10 June 2025 (Case No. 6580/2025)
The High Court of Justice of Catalonia assessed whether a particular conduct should be classified as a dismissal or a voluntary resignation. In this case, an employee sent a WhatsApp message to the company asking them to “prepare the dismissal papers”. In response, the company informed her—also via WhatsApp—that it would prepare the documentation for a “voluntary resignation” as per her request. Later, the company asked whether she preferred to collect the documents in person or receive them by registered post, to which she replied that they should be sent by post.

Accordingly, the company sent a registered letter confirming the preparation of the voluntary resignation documents dated 13/03/2022.

Subsequently, the employee challenged the termination, claiming it was a dismissal and arguing that she had never explicitly requested a resignation in her WhatsApp message.

The Labour Court No. 21 of Barcelona dismissed the claim, and the High Court upheld the ruling. It concluded that the termination was a resignation, not a dismissal, based on the following: the employee initiated the conversation by asking for dismissal papers, which, although not a formal request, clearly expressed her unilateral intention to end the employment relationship. The employer accepted this the same day via WhatsApp, replying “...Okay, thanks! I’ll send you the number of the girl so you can return the keys.” The company then followed up to confirm the preparation of the resignation documents.

Therefore, the court considered that the termination resulted from a resignation, as the employee had clearly, unequivocally, and unilaterally expressed her intention to end the contract, which the company accepted. The High Court of Justice of Catalonia confirmed the lower court’s decision.

Judgment of the National Court, 4 July 2025 (Case No. 182/2025)
The National Court examined whether a contact centre company was obliged to provide trade union sections with information on the “parameters, rules, and instructions” used by the software system that assigned variable days off and rest periods for rotating shift staff. The CGT union sections requested this information under Article 64.4(d) of the Workers’ Statute.

The company denied the applicability of this provision, arguing that it did not use any “algorithm” or “artificial intelligence system” affecting working conditions. In response, the union filed a collective dispute claim, requesting that the company be ordered to provide the information under Article 64.4(d) and to pay €6,250 in compensation for violating the fundamental right to freedom of association. The unions CCOO, USO, and CSIF joined the claim.

The National Court upheld the claim, finding that the company had indeed used “algorithms or mathematical formulas” to determine working conditions. By denying the use of such technology to avoid providing the information required under Article 64.4(d) of the Workers’ Statute, the company was also ordered to compensate the claimant union with the amount requested.

Specifically, the judgment: (1) Declares a violation of the fundamental right to freedom of association of the CGT union by the defendant company, for failing to inform CGT delegates in the union sections of Barcelona, Madrid, and Seville about the parameters, rules, and instructions underlying the algorithms used by the company that affect employees’ working conditions, as well as the algorithmic or automated system used to assign variable rest days in those workplaces. (2) Declares the nullity of such business practice. (3) Orders the company to pay €6,250 in compensation to CGT for damages caused by the violation of trade union freedom. (4) Orders the company to immediately provide clear and accessible information to CGT delegates in Barcelona, Madrid, and Seville about the parameters, rules, and instructions behind the algorithms used by the company that affect working conditions, as well as the algorithmic or automated system used to assign variable rest days.

Legislative Developments

Royal Decree-Law 9/2025 of 29 July, extending parental leave
This regulation amends the Workers’ Statute and the Basic Statute of Public Employees to align Spanish legislation with Directive (EU) 2019/1158. Specifically, it extends parental leave by 3 weeks, increasing it from 16 to 19 weeks per parent. For single-parent families, the leave is extended to 32 weeks. The leave is structured as follows: a) 6 uninterrupted and mandatory weeks for each parent immediately after birth or adoption, to be taken full-time; b) 11 weeks (or 22 for single-parent families), to be taken consecutively or intermittently until the child turns 12 months old; c) 2 weeks (or 4 for single-parent families), to be taken consecutively or intermittently until the child turns 8 years old. This extension came into force on 31 July 2025, and the transitional provision states that it applies to events occurring from 2 August 2024. Leave and financial benefits may be requested from 1 January 2026, without requiring a new recognition of the right, and in accordance with the existing rules on voluntary parental leave. The Royal Decree-Law was ratified by the Spanish Parliament on 9 September 2025, and is pending publication as a formal law in the Official State Gazette (BOE).

Other Notable Developments

Resolution of 8 September 2025 by the State Secretariat for Labour approving the 2025–2027 Strategic Plan of the Labour and Social Security Inspectorate (ITSS)
The plan sets out key priorities: ensuring employment stability (monitoring fraud in temporary contracts, misuse of discontinuous permanent contracts, and dismissals during probation), overseeing working time with a digital and interoperable time register and the right to disconnect, ensuring wage compliance (including the minimum wage) and proper application of collective agreements, strengthening workers’ representation rights, and safeguarding health and safety (accidents, occupational cancer, and psychosocial risks).

It intensifies the fight against precarious and unprotected work (platform work, bogus self-employment, part-time fraud, telework, letterbox companies, and irregular cooperatives), expands Social Security oversight (contributions, benefits, and mutual societies), and reinforces the inspectorate’s role in collective dismissals.

The plan also modernises the organisation through greater specialisation and training (Labour Inspectorate School), territorial coordination, data use and cross-referencing for planning and “shock plans”, digitalisation of interactions with citizens and public administrations, and increased transparency and accountability. All of this is aligned with the 2030 Agenda and subject to budget availability.

Order PJC/908/2025 of 8 August, establishing the operational date of the Independent Authority for Whistleblower Protection (A.A.I.)
This order sets 1 September 2025 as the start date for the Independent Authority for Whistleblower Protection (A.A.I.), created under Law 2/2023 on the protection of individuals reporting regulatory breaches and anti-corruption efforts (the “Whistleblowing Law”). The A.A.I. will be chaired by Mr Manuel Villoria Mendieta. This strengthens protection against retaliation for whistleblowers and provides legal certainty for obligated entities within an operational and coordinated institutional framework.

Companies that have already appointed a person responsible for the internal reporting channel must notify the A.A.I. within two months of its entry into operation, i.e. by 1 November 2025. As this date falls on a non-working day, the deadline is extended to the next working day: 3 November 2025.

In this information alert, we provide a summary of several recent court rulings addressing key issues in the labour field. These decisions, issued between May and July 2025, deal with issues such as the concurrence of collective agreements, the guarantee of indemnity, company disciplinary powers, parental leave, the equalization of conditions between temporary agency and user company staff, and the long-awaited Supreme Court ruling on the open debate on additional compensation to the legal rate for unfair dismissal. These rulings outline important implications for companies and employees, as well as the current interpretations of the labour regulations in force in Spain.

Recent jurisprudential developments

Supreme Court Judgment of 27 May 2025 (Appeal. No. 673/2023)

The purpose of this ruling is to determine whether the plaintiff hired by a Temporary Employment Agency (ETT) is entitled to receive the voluntary improvement in temporary incapacity (TI) provided for in the agreements applicable to the user companies in which he provided services under contracts for the provision of services. 

First, the Supreme Court analyses the evolution of the wording of article 11 of Law 14/1994 of 1 June 1994 regulating temporary employment agencies (LETT), which is the subject of the judgments cited by the defendant. This article regulates the rights of workers, the initial aim of which is that the economic result obtained by the temporary agency worker while providing services in the user undertaking should not be less than that obtained by a worker in the user undertaking for the same work. In relation to this, the STS 7 February 2007 determined that article 11 did not include voluntary improvements in a situation of TI because these are not payments directly linked to the work.

Directive 2008/104/EC of the European Parliament and Council of 19 November 2008, however, led to a modification of Article 11 LETT, which requires a new interpretation by the Supreme Court. To do so, the Court relies on the CJEU of 22 February 2024 (C-649-2022), which determines that, in cases of total permanent incapacity, although the voluntary improvement is not paid directly in exchange for an employment benefit, it is granted indirectly by the employer to the worker by reason of employment. The European Court therefore states that the concept of remuneration must be interpreted broadly, including compensation in the event of total permanent incapacity.

On this basis, the Supreme Court determines that there is no difference between the permanent incapacity in the CJEU judgment cited above and the temporary incapacity in the case before it, since in both cases the purpose is to compensate the worker for the loss of income resulting from the impossibility of exercising his or her profession. Thus, the concept of 'essential working and employment conditions' includes remuneration, including within that concept also the voluntary improvements to the TD benefit provided for in the collective agreements applicable to user undertakings.

It therefore concludes that the person hired by a temporary agency and seconded on assignment must benefit from the voluntary improvement provided for in the collective agreement of the user company for cases of temporary incapacity.

Supreme Court Judgment of 4 June 2025 (Appeal. No. 19/2024)

The STS of 4 June 2025, in unification of doctrine, annulled judgement 2775/2023 of 18 October, handed down by the High Court of Justice of Andalusia (Seville) in appeal 3895/2021, and confirmed the judgement handed down by Social Court no. 4 of Huelva (no. 167/2021). In the aforementioned judgement of the Supreme Court, three different essential issues of the employment relationship between the Ayamonte Town Council and the plaintiff in the context of the contractual termination are discussed: (i) the nature of the employment relationship, (ii) a conflict of competence between administrations and (iii) an allegation of breach of the guarantee of indemnity. The first controversy that the judgement deals with is the nature of the employment relationship between the parties, comparing whether the employment relationship was temporary or permanent and, therefore, there was fraudulent hiring and the dismissal had to be declared null and void. In this regard, the Court established the validity of the temporary contract signed, taking into account the autonomy and substantive nature of the programme in which it is framed, and proceeded to establish that the termination due to expiry of the term was in accordance with the law. Secondly, the judgment discusses a conflict of administrative competences. 

The Court analyses whether the functions of vocational guidance and support for labour market insertion that constituted the activity are the responsibility of the local council or, on the contrary, constitute an exclusive competence of the Autonomous Community. In relation to the above, the High Court ruled that executive employment policies are the responsibility of the Autonomous Community (in this case, Andalusia), and that, therefore, the municipal intervention is in any case "temporary and occasional" and is therefore not a normal or permanent activity of the City Council. Thirdly, the judgement clarifies questions about the alleged breach of the guarantee of indemnity, rejecting the allegation of retaliatory dismissal, insofar as it considers that the long period of time between the complaint and the termination (10 months) excludes the possibility of such a breach. However, it warns that the criterion of temporal proximity must be applied with caution, and cannot be elevated to absolute terms. Consequently, the judgment of the SCJ of Andalusia is upheld and annulled, confirming in turn the judgment of the lower court which rejected the claim and declaring it to be final. In short, STS 3020/2025 unifies doctrine by establishing that temporary contracts for subsidised employment programmes are valid when they have their own autonomy and substance, being the main competence of the autonomous administration, and establishes relevant criteria to be taken into account with regard to the violation of the guarantee of indemnity.

Supreme Court Judgment of 10 June 2025 (Appeal. No. 3011/2023)

The issue under debate focuses on determining whether the disciplinary sanction imposed on a worker should be declared null and void on the grounds that there is no correspondence between the classification of the offence (very serious) and the sanction imposed (corresponding to serious misconduct). In short, the Supreme Court analyses whether the employer's disciplinary powers must be strictly subject to the principle of typicality and proportionality between qualification and sanction, and whether when the sanction finally imposed is the corresponding to a less serious offence than the one qualified, this implies the nullity of the sanction imposed.

The case concerns a worker who was sanctioned with a two-day suspension from employment and pay for an offence classified as very serious, consisting of "ill-treatment by word or deed or serious lack of respect for superiors, colleagues or subordinates". The substantive issue was to determine whether that sanction was appropriate, since the two-day suspension of employment and pay was provided for in the collective agreement applicable to serious misconduct, whereas for very serious misconduct the collective agreement provided for sanctions ranging from eleven days to two months' suspension. The penalty was initially upheld by the Social Court, but subsequently overturned by the Madrid High Court of Justice. Finally, the Supreme Court analysed the congruence between the qualification of the misconduct and the sanction imposed and concluded that the company may impose lighter sanctions than those foreseen for very serious misconduct.

In short, in the words of the High Court, the employer, who has the power to leave without sanction a certain behaviour of one of its employees that could constitute a disciplinary offence, when it decides to sanction it, may do so by resorting to a less serious sanction than that provided for in the agreement for the type of offence; naturally, the lighter sanction chosen must also be provided for and defined in the collective agreement, and may not create an "ex novo" sanction.

Supreme Court Judgment of 11 June 2025 (Appeal No. 3187/2023).

In its judgment of 11 June 2025, the Supreme Court ruled on the concurrence between the collective agreement signed between the company and the workers' legal representatives and the sectoral collective agreement in force for the province in which the workplace in which the claimant workers work is located. Turning to the merits of the case, the Court first resolves the question of the concept of "workplace". That question arises from the absence of administrative registration with the relevant labour authority of the workplace in Ávila, where the workers perform their duties for the company. In that regard, the Court holds that the production unit in which the applicants provide services on a permanent basis must be regarded as a work centre, even if it is not formally registered with the Labour Authority. It therefore held that, for the purposes of classification as a workplace, it is sufficient that it is the place to which the workers go to provide their services and in which the undertaking has established productive elements. In relation to the main subject-matter of the appeal, the dispute arises as to whether the collective agreement concluded between the company and the workers' legal representatives, with a specific geographical scope and, consequently, of an infra-company nature, takes precedence over the provincial sectoral agreement as regards pay. In response to this question, the Supreme Court established that the agreement negotiated exclusively with the legal representation of the workers in a specific geographical area, which in this case is smaller than the company area, does not qualify as a company agreement and, therefore, cannot in any way have priority over the provincial sectoral agreement.

Supreme Court Judgment of 16 July 2025 (Appeal. No. 3993/2024)

The Plenary of the Social Division of the Supreme Court has handed down an important ruling, which addresses whether a worker dismissed unfairly has the right to receive, in addition to the fixed compensation for disciplinary dismissal in article 56.1 ET, additional compensation in accordance with the circumstances that may arise in the specific case, in application of article 10 of ILO Convention 158 and article 24 of the revised European Social Charter (ESC).

In this Judgment, on a practical level, it is concluded that the standard compensation is the one chosen by our legislator in art. 56.1 ET and that art. 24 of the revised European Social Charter cannot be considered, in any way, as a directly applicable rule displacing the applicability of the provisions of our domestic law.

The Supreme Court has already issued another relevant ruling on 19 December 2024 (STS 1350/2024), in which it concluded that, if the dismissal is declared unfair, the judicial body cannot recognise an additional and different compensation to that established in art. 56 ET, in accordance with the provisions of ILO Convention No. 158. Due to the timing of the dismissal in question in the aforementioned judgment, it was not possible to assess article 24 of the revised CSE, which came into force in Spain on 1 July 2021.

With this new judgment, the High Court closes the possibility of setting an additional compensation in addition to that set in the case of unfair dismissal, under the current legislation. This debate will have to be addressed, if necessary, by the legislature, by amending the regulatory framework. This judgement, although it includes individual opinions, undoubtedly contributes to the much-needed legal certainty.

Social Court Judgment No. 1 of Barcelona of 30 June 2025 (Decision No. 567/2025)

In this ruling, the Social Court No. 1 of Barcelona recognises for the first time, in the private sector, the paid nature of the parental leave provided for in Article 48a of the ET, in accordance with the provisions of Directive (EU) 2019/2158 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on the reconciliation of family and working life for parents and carers, in its Article 8.

This judgment considers that this article is sufficiently clear, precise and decisive to be directly applicable in view of Spain's failure to transpose the Directive by 2 August 2022. In the Court's opinion, the above determines the interpretation of the domestic legislation in accordance with the said provisions of Community law by application of the principle of the primacy of Union law. 

In view of the above, the Court upheld the worker's claim and recognised his right to parental leave pay by direct application of Community law, at the defendant company's expense. 

We must be attentive to the outcome of this ruling, and above all to the legislative development of this issue. For the time being, the national legislator has not established the remuneration or financial benefit of parental leave, so we must act with the utmost caution.